Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents by Robert M. Anderson et al.
 
       H H   I I   E E   R R 
 
Harvard Institute of Economic Research 
 
Discussion Paper Number 2056 
 
Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets 




Robert M. Anderson, Glenn Ellison 








This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2005papers/2005list.html 
 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=646702 
 Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible
Agents1
Robert M. Anderson, Glenn Ellison, and Drew Fudenberg
January 4, 2005
1University of California, Berkeley, Massachusetts Insitute of Technology, and Harvard Uni-
versity. E-mail: anderson@econ.berkeley.edu, gellison@mit.edu, dfudenberg@harvard.edu. This
work was supported by NSF grants SES-0214164, SES-0219205, SES-0112018, and SES-0426199.Abstract
Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called “buyers”and “sellers:”In
the ﬁrst period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; fol-
lowing this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there.
Buyers prefer locations with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the re-
verse preferences. We study the set of possible equilibrium sizes for the two markets, and
show that two markets of very diﬀerent sizes can co-exist even if larger markets are more
eﬃcient. This extends the analysis of Ellison and Fudenberg [3] (EF), who ignored the
constraint that the number of agents of each type in each market should be an integer, and
instead analyzed the “quasi-equilibria”where agents are treated as inﬁnitely divisible.1 Introduction
In many economic models, agents beneﬁt from interactions with agents whose character-
istics are in some way diﬀerent than their own. In exchange economies, agents gain from
interactions with agents whose endowments or preferences are diﬀerent; in economies with
production, gains come about when producers interact with consumers, and in opposite-
sex marriage “markets,” gains arise from men meeting women. If the agents must choose
between several locations or markets in which to conduct these interactions, the question
arises: Should we expect all activity to concentrate in a single market or location, or should
we expect to see multiple active marketplaces?
To address this question, we consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents,
whom we will call “buyers” and “sellers.” In the ﬁrst period of the model, agents simul-
taneously choose between two identical possible locations or markets. Following this, the
agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there; the resulting
payoﬀs are determined by the numbers of each type of agent who chose the same location.
We suppose that buyers prefer markets with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and that
sellers have the reverse preferences. Thus, when the numbers of buyers and sellers are even,
there is an equilibrium where the two markets are exactly the same size.1 Our question is
whether this split-market equilibrium is indeed an isolated equilibrium, or whether there
is a wide range (a “plateau”) of equilibrium size ratios for the two markets.
The traditional view (see e.g. [9]) was that the split-market equilibrium will be a knife-
edge whenever there are increasing returns, that is when larger markets are more eﬃcient.
However, Ellison and Fudenberg [3] (EF) pointed out that in markets with a ﬁnite number
of agents the eﬀect of increasing returns can be oﬀset by a “market impact eﬀect”: When
a seller contemplates a switch from market 1 to market 2, she takes into account that her
joining market 2 will increase the seller-buyer ratio there, and thereby make that market
less attractive for all sellers, including herself. It is true that this market impact eﬀect
typically vanishes as the number of agents in each market grows to inﬁnity, but as EF point
1More precisely, our results imply that when the numbers of buyers and sellers are even and suﬃciently
large, there is an equilibrium where the two markets are exactly the same size. We expect that typically
this equilibrium will also be present even when the numbers of buyers and sellers is small, but have not
tried to provide precise conditions under which this is true.
1out, the eﬀect of increasing returns typically vanishes as well. Moreover, EF argue that in
many models of interest the eﬀects vanish at the same rate. When this is true, EF show that
the incentive constraints for equilibrium are consistent with two large markets being active
even when their sizes are unequal, and they give a lower bound on the width of this plateau.
However, they ignore the constraint that the number of agents of each type in each market
should be an integer, and instead analyze the “quasi-equilibria”where agents are treated
as inﬁnitely divisible; their formal results say nothing about the existence of full equilibria.
In the context of competing auction sites, Ellison, Fudenberg and Mobius (EFM) [4] show
that when the number of buyers is large and buyer values are uniformly distributed, for any
quasi-equilibrium size ratio α of the game with B buyers and S sellers, there is a nearby S0
for which the game with B buyers and S0 sellers has an exact equilibrium with size ratio
approximately α. This shows that exact equilibria exist in some large economies, but says
nothing about the number of equilibria for a typical pair (S,B). Indeed, it leaves open the
possibility that most pairs (S,B) have no exact equilibria other than complete tipping.
The point of this paper is to complete the analysis of tipping in large markets by
providing a thorough analysis of equilibrium, paying attention to the constraint that each
agent is indivisible. Put brieﬂy, we have three main ﬁndings about economies (payoﬀ
functions and aggregate seller/buyer ratios) that satisfy the EF assumptions.
1. Despite the EF result about large economies always having a large quasi-equilibrium
plateau, under some natural speciﬁcations of payoﬀs there are sequences {Sn,Bn}
with Bn → ∞ that completely tip for all n. That is, at each point in the sequence,
the only pure strategy equilibria are the ones in which all agents choose the same
location.
2. For any ε > 0, there is a bound M such that if the aggregate buyer-seller and seller-
buyer ratios are at least ε away from every integer, and the number of agents is at
least M, then there is a range of exact equilibria. For ﬁxed payoﬀ functions the
width of this range (expressed in terms of the proportion of agents in each market)
is independent of the number of buyers and sellers when these are large.
3. For generic sequences {Sn,Bn} with Bn → ∞ and Sn/Bn convergent, there is a
2plateau of exact equilibria for all large n. This plateau includes all of the size ratios
predicted by the EF result, and typically includes others as well. Moreover, the
asymptotic density of equilibria (i.e. the proportion of integers in a given range such
that there is an equilibrium with that many buyers in one market, and the rest in
the other) converges to a speciﬁc piecewise-linear function we identify. When there
are fewer buyers than sellers, for almost all integer numbers of buyers in the center
of the plateau, there is an equilibrium with that many buyers in market 1.
The set of exact equilibria described in point 2 can be much smaller than the set of
quasi-equilibria delivered by the EF result. The genericity result in point 3 is proved by
showing that the results obtain whenever Sn/Bn has an irrational limit. We believe that
the theorem mentioned in point 2 can be extended to obtain larger and larger lower bounds
on the equilibrium plateau by bounding the buyer-seller ratios away from 1/2, 1/3, 2/3,
etc. through the rational numbers, but this seems too cumbersome to be worth pursuing
given the availability of the result in point 3.
The conclusions about the equilibrium plateau in point 3 apply whenever Sn/Bn con-
verges to an irrational limit. Since the set of rational numbers has measure 0, this is
analogous to the formulation of a generic sequence of purely competitive economies in, for
example, Grodal [5] and H. Dierker [2]. The reason that sequences with an irrational limit
are better behaved is closely related to the fact that the map that sends x to(x+y)mod1 is
an ergodic transformation if and only if y is irrational.
The reason that the result in point 3 delivers more size ratios than EF is that their
result provided a condition for the incentive constraints to be satisﬁed with exactly the
same seller/buyer ratio in each market. The proof of the new result, like the EFM char-
acterization of the quasi-equilibrium set in the case of uniformly distributed buyer values,
allows the seller/buyer ratios in the two markets to be slightly unequal, which in some
cases leads to a substantially larger range of size ratios.
The result in point 3 is proved using nonstandard analysis, which is a way of formalizing
and manipulating inﬁnitesimal, and inﬁnitely large, quantities. The statement of the result,
however, is entirely standard and can be understood without any knowledge of nonstandard
3analysis.2
2 The Geometry of Equilibrium
Consider a simple two-stage model of location choice. In the ﬁrst stage S sellers and B
buyers simultaneously choose between market 1 or market 2. If Si sellers and Bi buyers
chose market i, then the market game gives the sellers in market i an expected payoﬀ
of us(Si,Bi) and the buyers an expected payoﬀ of us(Si,Bi).3 In a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, there are four incentive constraints that must be satisﬁed: First, sellers in
market 1 must be willing to stay in market 1, which is equivalent to the inequality
(S1) us(S1,B1) ≥ us(S2 + 1,B2)
We call this the S1 constraint. Then there are the analogous constraints that sellers in
market 2 must be willing to stay in market 2, buyers in market 1 must be willing to stay
in market 1, and buyers in market 1 must be willing to stay in market 2. We call these
constraints S2,B1, and B2 respectively.
Given the total numbers S of sellers and B of buyers, an allocation (S1,S2,B1,B2) is a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
(i) (Incentive Compatibility) the four incentive constraints S1,S2,B1,B2 are satisﬁed.
(ii) (Feasibility) S1+S2 = S,B1+B2 = B, and S1,S2,B1, and B2 are all non-negative.
(iii) (Indivisibility) S1,S2,B1, and B2 are all integers.
EF call an allocation a quasiequilibrium if it satisﬁes (i) and (ii).
Assumption 1 There is a nonempty interval Γ = [γ, ¯ γ] ⊂ (0,∞), continuously diﬀeren-
tiable functions Fs and Fb, and continuous functions Gs and Gb on Γ with F 0
s < 0 and
2For more information about nonstandard analysis, see Hurd and Loeb [6] and Anderson [1]. A
methatheorem in nonstandard analysis guarantees the existence of a standard proof for the result; however,
the standard proof is likely to be quite complex.
3Although the formal model we present is one of Nash equilibria in a one-stage game, the intended
interpretation is that we are analyzing ﬁrst-stage choices in the subgame-perfect equilibria of a two- stage
game, where the payoﬀ functions that this paper treats as primitives are computed as the Nash equilibria
of the game at each market. These payoﬀ functions will typically only be deﬁned for integer numbers of
agents; our assumptions are then on any extensin of these functions to the reals.
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hold uniformly over γ ∈ Γ in the limit as B → ∞.
We will maintain this assumption throughout the paper. EF argue that it is satisﬁed in
many models of economic interest, including the Ellison, Fudenberg and M¨ obius [4] model
of competing auctions, Krugman’s [8] model of Marshallian labor market competition, and
a two-population version of Pagano’s [10] model of competing securities markets. They
show that it allows the approximation of the incentive constraints at allocations with the
same seller/buyer ratios in each market, and use this to prove the following result.
Theorem 0 (Ellison and Fudenberg [3]) Assume A1, and set
r
∗(γ) = max
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∗(γ) = max{0,1/2 − 1/2r
∗(γ)}.
Then for any ε > 0, there exists a B such that for any integer B > B and any integer
S with S/B ∈ Γ, the model with B buyers and S sellers has a quasi-equilibrium with B1
buyers in market 1, for every B1 with B1/B ∈ [α∗(S/B) + ε,1 − α∗(S/B) − ε].
This result on its own says nothing about the set of full equilibria of the game. To ﬁx
ideas, we reproduce (as Figure 1) two illustrations from EFM that show the four constraints
in an auction model with uniformly distributed buyer values.4 Here the lines S1, S2, B1, B2
correspond to the points where the corresponding incentive constraints hold with equality.
That is, along S1, each seller that is currently choosing market 1 is just indiﬀerent between
4In EFM, each seller has a single unit to sell, and reservation value 0 for keeping the item; each buyer
wants to puruchase a single unit, and buyer values are determined after location choice. Equilibrium thus
payoﬀs in each market are determined by a uniform-price auction.
5staying in market 1 or switching to market 2. Since sellers prefer there to be fewer other
sellers, the points above this line are not consistent with equilibrium. Reasoning in this
way about each of the incentive constraints, we see that the quasi-equilibrium set is the
diamond-shaped region in the center of the ﬁgure. The exact equilibria, marked with stars,
are the integer grid points that lie in the quasi-equilibrium set.
The top panel corresponds to a model with ten buyers and ﬁve sellers. In equilibrium
the smaller market can have two buyers and one seller, or four buyers and two sellers; there
is no equilibrium with three or ﬁve buyers in the smaller market. With three buyers in
the smaller market, for example, there are a range of values of near one-and-a-half that
satisfy the quasi-equilibrium conditions, but none of them satisfy the integer constraints.
The bottom panel gives an idea of what happens as markets grows to thirty buyers and
ﬁfteen sellers. The quasi-equilibrium region looks much “ﬂatter” because the impact of one
agent moving from one market to another is smaller, so the utilities in the two markets
need to be closer together in order to discourage agents whose equilibrium utility is lower
from switching markets. (Lemma 4 makes a related observation: If (S1,S2,B1,B2) is a
quasi-equilibrium, then the seller/buyer ratio in market 1 must equal the overall ratio S/B
plus a term that goes to 0 at rate O(1/B1).) The exact equilibria are again marked with
stars.
This leads us to the current question: when will there be exact equilibria? As the
economy grows, the quasi-equilibrium set gets “narrower”, suggesting it might be harder
to ﬁnd an equilibrium at a given point, but at the same time there are more candidate
integers in a given range of relative sizes , so the answer may not be obvious.
3 An Example with Complete Tipping
The main result of EF is that models satisfying Assumption 1 always have a large plateau
of quasi-equilibria with two active markets when the number of agents is large. In this
section, we show that the result does not always extend to a true equilibrium analysis.
In particular, we provide a class of sequences of economies in which the increasing returns
satisfy Assumption 1, but which have no pure strategy equilibria other than the completely
“tipped” equilibria with all activity in one market.
6Quasi-equilibrium Set
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Figure 1: The quasiequilibrium and equilibrium sets in the EFM competing auction model. 7Example 1 Let us and ub be utility functions satisfying Assumption 1. Suppose that
us(γB,B) is increasing in B and decreasing in γ, and that ub(γB,B) is increasing in
B and γ. Then, regardless of the size of B, a model with B buyers and S = B + 1 sellers
has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium with two active markets.
Proof
Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium with 0 < B1 < B and 0 < S1 < S
sellers in market 1, and and B2 = B − B1 buyers and S2 = S − S1 sellers in market 2, and
assume without loss of generality that B1 ≤ B2.
We proceed to rule out all possible relationships between S1 and B1
• If S1 < B1, then a buyer in market 1 will defect. After the defection market 2 will be
larger (have more buyers) and have a more favorable seller/buyer ratio for buyers.
• If S1 = B1, then a buyer in market 1 will defect. Market 2 is larger after the defection.
Also, S1 = B1 implies S2 = B2 + 1, so after the defection the the ratio of sellers to
buyers in market 2 becomes one, the same as in market 1. Hence, the buyer is better
oﬀ after the defection
• If S1 = B1 + 1 and B1 = B2, then a buyer in market 2 will defect. S2 = B2 so the
situation is exactly as in the case above, but with the labels reversed.
• If S1 = B1 + 1 and B1 < B2, then a seller in market 1 will defect. Market 2 is
larger, and even after the defection its seller/buyer ratio is lower: (S2 + 1)/B2 =
(B2 + 1)/B2 < (B1 + 1)/B1 = S1/B1.
• If S1 > B1+1, then a seller in market 1 will defect. Market 2 is at least as large, and
even after the deviation it will have a lower seller/buyer ratio.
In some sense the assumption that S = B + 1 in the example is a worst case for the
existence of equilibria. Equilibrium requires that the seller-buyer ratios be very close in
the two markets. When market 1 and market 2 are about the same size, the fact that
we have to put the one extra seller somewhere means we have to have about one-half too
8few sellers in one market and about one-half too many sellers in the other. The “market
impact” of moving to the large market is one seller or one buyer, so it doesn’t outweigh
this. This suggests that ﬁnding equilibria may be easier when the seller-buyer is bounded
away from 1, as then the impact of the “rounding error” is less severe. More generally, one
way of looking at the example is that the size of the set of equilibria will depend on how
closely the overall seller/buyer ratio can be approximated in the two markets when we are
restricted to integer allocations.
4 A Suﬃcient Condition for a Plateau of Equilibria in
Large Finite Economies
In this section we provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a plateau of true equi-
libria. The suﬃcient conditions illustrate that the nonexistence example was special. In
the example, the seller-buyer ratio is very close to one, but not equal to one. The main
proposition of this section shows that if the ratio of the number of agents on the two sides of
the market is not almost exactly an integer (and the number of agents is large), then there
is a nondegenerate plateau of untipped equilibria. It also shows that within the equilibrium
plateau the equilibria are not too far apart.
Let N be the set of non-negative integers. The main result of this section is
Theorem 1 Fix functions ub and us satisfying Assumption 1. There are constants α,k1,k2,k3,k4
with α < 1/2 such that for any ε > 0, any α ∈ [α,1 − α], and any positive integers B and
S satisfying
(i) S/B ∈ Γ,
(ii) |B/S − n| > ε and |S/B − n| > ε for all n ∈ N, and
(iii) B + S > k1 + k2/ε,
the model with B buyers and S sellers has an equilibrium with B1 buyers and S1 sellers in
market 1 for some B1, S1 with |B1/B−α| < (k3+k4/ε)/B and |S1/S−α| < (k3+k4/ε)/S.
The proof includes more information on the constants k1, k2, k3, and k4, including
explicit formulas for some of them. The following corollary is a simpler statement about
9the existence of an equilibrium plateau.
Corollary 1 Fix functions ub and us satisfying Assumption 1. Then there is α< 1/2 such
that for any ε > 0 and any δ > 0 there is an M such that if
(i) S/B ∈ Γ,
(ii) |B/S − n| > ε and |S/B − n| > ε for all n ∈ N, and
(iii) B + S > M,
then for every α ∈ [α,1 − α], the model with B buyers and S sellers has an equilibrium
with B1 buyers and S1 sellers in market 1 for some B1, S1 with |B1/B − α| < δ and
|S1/S − α| < δ.
Proof of Theorem 1
We proceed in two main steps. The ﬁrst step is to show that the quasiequilibrium set
contains a parallelogram in B-S space that includes all points on the line segment deﬁned
by B1/B = S1/S and B1/B ∈ [α,1 − α] and that is not “too thin.” The second step is
to show that every point in the parallelogram is within a speciﬁed distance of an integer
point that is also within the parallelogram. The integer points are true equilibria.
To simplify the exposition we will prove the result only for pairs with S ≤ B. “Sellers”
and “buyers” are completely symmetric in the model, so the argument for B ≤ S would
be identical.
Lemma 1 There exist α and N with α < 1/2 such that for all B and S with B + S > N
and γ ≡ S/B ∈ Γ, it is a quasi-equilibrium of the model with B buyers and S sellers to
have B1 buyers and S1 sellers in market 1 for any B1 and S1 with and any B1,S1 with
B1/B ∈ [α,1 − α] and |S1/S − B1/B| ≤ 1/4B.
Remark: When we graph the space of allocations as in Figures 1 and 2, with B1/B on
the x-axis and S1/S, on the y-axis, the lemma says that the quasiequilibium set contains
the parallelogram bounded by (α,α ± 1/4B) and (1 − α,1 − α ± 1/4B).
Proof of Lemma 1
We will show that buyers in market 1 do not wish to switch to market 2, i.e. that the
B1 constraint is satisﬁed. The argument for the B2 constraint is identical. The arguments
for the S1 and S2 constraints are very similar.
10We begin with the “hardest” case for the B1 constraint: when S1 = (α − 1/4B)S and
B1 = αB. In this case we need to show that
ub (α − 1/4B)S,αB) ≥ ub(1 − α + 1/4)S,(1 − α)B + 1).






































whenever B is greater than some B. (The restriction to S/B ∈ [γ,γ] ⊂ (0,∞) implies that
B is always large when B +S is large.) There exists B so that this is true for all B > B if




























We can choose α ∈ (1/4,1/2) so that this is true uniformly over γ. Note that for the
same α the equation we would have derived had we started with any larger S1 will also be
satisﬁed due to the monotonicity of Fb. Hence, having chosen an α satisfying this equation
we can then choose B so that B1 is satisﬁed for all B1 and S1 in the parallelogram provided
that B > B, which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Given the result of lemma 1 it suﬃces to prove the following lemma about parallelograms
containing grid points. Lemma 2 concludes that there exist integers B1 and S1 satisfying
several properties. The ﬁrst two of these are that (B1/B,S1/S) belongs to the parallelogram
described in the Lemma 1, which implies that it is a true equilibrium to have B1 buyers
and S1 sellers in market 1. The last two indicate we can ﬁnd such equilibria close to every
point of the plateau identiﬁed in the theorem.
Lemma 2 Assume α < 1/2. Then there are constants k1,k2,k3,k4 such that for any ε > 0,
any α ∈ [α,1 − α] and any S,B satisfying (i) S ≤ B, (ii) S/B ∈ Γ, (iii) |B/S − n| > ε
11for all n ∈ N, and (iv) S > k1 + k2/ε, there exist integers S1 and B1 such that B1/B ∈
[α,1 − α], |S1/S − B1/B| < 1/4B, |B1/B − α| < (k3 + k4/ε)(1/B), and |S1/S − α| <
(k3 + k4/ε)(1/S).
Proof of Lemma 2
Fix some α ∈ [α,1−α]. We assume here that α > 1/2. (A symmetric argument applies
for α < 1
2.
Let B0
1 be the integer closest to αB in the set of integers B0 such that B0/B ∈ (α,1− α)
(This set will be non-empty for k1 suﬃciently large given the assumption that S/B ∈ Γ.)
We now deﬁne a sequence of integer pairs (Sk
1,Bk
1) by repeatedly reducing S1 by one





  < 1/4B. The key observation is that this always
occurs for some k with k ≤ 4 + 1/ε.
Let S1
1 = b(B0
1/B)Sc. Note that S1
1/S ≤ B0
1/B. Let B1






1/B + 1/4B, then choose we will choose S1 = S1
1 and B1 = B1
1. Note in
this case that S1 and B1 satisfy |S1/S − B1/B| < 1/4B.
Otherwise, if for some k ≥ 1 we have Sk
1/S ≥ Bk
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We then choose (S1,B1) = (Sk
1,Bk






Claim: This choice of (S1,B1) is well-deﬁned and the index k satisﬁes k ≤ 3 + 1/ε.





1) are the desired (S1,B1) if ak ∈ (−1/2,0].
The deﬁnition of B1
1 as the largest integer satisfying B1
1/B ≤ S1
1/S +1/4B implies that
(B1
1 + 1)/B > S1
1/S + 1/4B, a1 = B(S1
1/S − B1
1/B − 1/4B) ∈ [−1/2,1/2).
If (S1
1,B1
















1 − bB/Sc if x ≤ ak + 1/2
Bk




















B − bB/Sc − 1
4B

= ak − x if x ≤ ak + 1/2
ak + (1 − x) if x > ak + 1/2
We complete the proof of our claim by considering two cases:
Case 1: x ≤ 1/2.
In this case the dynamics are ak+1 = ak − x whenever ak > 0. Hence we have ak ∈





< 2 + 1/x ≤ 1 + 2/ε.
Case 2: x > 1/2.
If a1 ∈ [−1/2,0], then (S1
1,B1
1) has the desired property. If a1 ∈ [x − 1/2,1/2), then
a2 = a1 − x ∈ [−1/2,0], so (S2
1,B2
1) has the desired property. Finally, if a1 ∈ (0,x − 1/2),
then a2 = a1 + 1 − x, and aj+1 = aj + 1 − x for all j with aj ∈ (0,x − 1/2). Hence,
a1+d(x−1/2−a1)/(1−x)e ∈ (x − 1/2,1/2). Hence (Sk,Bk) has the desired property for k =
2 + d(x − 1/2 − a1)/(1 − x)e ≤ 2 + d1/2(1 − x)e ≤ 3 + 1/2ε.
The statement of the Lemma requires that (S1,B1) have four properties (which hold
uniformly given some choice of k1, k2, k3, and k4).
The ﬁrst of these was that B1/B ∈ [α,1−α]. It is immediate from out construction that
B1 ∈ [B0
1 −kdB/Se,B0
1 for k ≤ 3+1/ε. The fact that B0
1/B ≤ 1−α implies B1/B ≤ 1−α.
Given that α ≥ 1/2 we have B1/B ≥ 1/2 − 1/B − (3 + 1/ε)(1/S + 1/B). This is greater
than α when B > k1 + k2/ε given an appropriate choice of k1 and k2.
The second of these was that |S1/S − B1/B| < 1/4B. We chose (S1,B1) so that this
holds.
The third is that |B1/B − αB| < (k3 + k4/ε)(1/B). That we can choose k3 and k4
so that this is true again follows easily from B1 ∈ [B0
1 − kdB/Se,B0
1 for k ≤ 3 + 1/ε.
The upper bound gives B1/B ≤ B0
1/B ≤ dαB/Be < α + (1/B). The lower bound gives
B1/B < α − 1/B − (3 + 1/ε)(dB/Se). Using dB/Se < 2(B/S), this is greater than
α − (k3 + k4/ε)(1/B) for k3 = 7 and k4 = 2.
The argument for the fourth condition is similar, but simpler because Sk
1 = S1
1 −(k−1).
This ﬁnishes the proof of lemma 2, and thus proves the theorem.
13Intuitively, what is going on in the lemma is that if we graph the parallelogram with
B1/B on the x-axis and S1/S on the y-axis, the parallelogram covers the section of the line
y = x between α and 1−α and has height (and thus width) 1/2B. The fact that its width
is only 1/2B means that when we look for an equilibrium with S1
1 sellers in market 1 we
ﬁnd that it doesn’t exist because B1
1 < S1
1 − 1/4B, but if we added one more buyer we
would jump across the parallelogram to a point with B1
1 + 1 > S1
1 + 1/4B. Now, however,
think about what happens if we just reduce S1
1 by one. Because B/S is not an integer,
at this y value the parallelogram doesn’t pass between the grid points at the same place.
Instead it is as if it is translated by B/S − dB/Se. When this quantity is some ε close to
zero we may have to translate the parallelogram by this amount 1/ε times before we hit a
grid point, but we will certainly hit one by this time.
Our theorem shows that we get a plateau of true equilibria whenever the seller-buyer
ratio (and the buyer-seller ratio) is not too close to an integer. The example of the previous
section was one where Sn/Bn was becoming closer and closer to one as n increased. It is
closeness to an integer, not being exactly equal to an integer, that can lead to nonexistence.
If the buyer-seller ratio is exactly equal to an integer, then an analogue to Theorem 1
would hold, and in fact we would obtain an even stronger result: there would be an exact
equilibrium for every S1 in the speciﬁed range.5 We should also note that having the buyer-
seller ratio close to an integer does not always lead to nonexistence of split-market equilibria.
For example, there will be a plateau of equilibria even when Sn/Bn → 1 provided that
Sn +Bn is even for all n, since that permits us to ﬁnd an integer pair in the parallelogram
of quasiequilibria.
5 The Density of the Set of Equilibria
The following theorem provides a characterization of the equilibrium set for sequences of
ﬁnite economies, and shows that there is a wide plateau of exact equilibria whenever the
limit ratio γ is irrational. The theorem states that the equilibrium set ﬁlls out a plateau
of width bounded away from zero, and speciﬁes the density of the set of equilibria. If
there are fewer sellers than buyers, then there exists α∗ < 1
2 depending on γ such that
5This is true if S ≤ B. When B ≤ S there would be an exact equilibrium for every B1 in the range.
14for essentially all integers S1 in (Sα∗,S(1 − α∗), there is an inequilibrium with S1 sellers
in market 1. If there are fewer buyers than sellers, then for essentially all integers B1 in
(Bα∗(γ),B(1 − α∗(γ)), there is an inequilibrium with B1 sellers in market 1.
Although the proof uses nonstandard analysis, the statement is completely standard
and can be understood without any knowledge of nonstandard analysis.
In the following deﬁnition, N(B,S) is essentially the set of B1 such that in the model
with B buyers and S sellers, there is an equilibrium with B1 buyers in market 1.6
Deﬁnition 1 Let N(B,S) denote the set of all B1 ∈ {0,1,...,B} such that there exists
S1 ∈ {0,1,...,S} such that
1. the market with B buyers and S sellers has a Nash equilibrium with B1 buyers and
S1 sellers in market 1; and





















The following deﬁnition speciﬁes, for each γ, a piecewise linear function of α which is
strictly positive on an open interval containing α = 1
2. We shall see that the density of the

























     
     
0 if α ∈ [0,α∗(γ)]
(α−α∗(γ))min{1,γ}
α∗∗(γ)−α∗(γ) if α ∈ (α∗(γ),α∗∗(γ))
min{1,γ} if α ∈ [α∗∗(γ), 1 − α∗∗(γ)]
(1−α−α∗(γ))min{1,γ}
α∗∗(γ)−α∗(γ) if α ∈ (1 − α∗∗(γ),1 − α∗(γ))
0 if α ∈ [1 − α∗∗(γ),1]
(2)
6N(B,S) is actually a slightly smaller set than the one just described, because of condition 2. If S1
B1 6∈ Γ,
or S2
B2 6∈ Γ, or a defection by one player could take the ratio of the sellers to buyers in that player’s new
market outside of Γ, then Assumption 1 gives us no control over payoﬀs, and hence makes it impossible
to prove that a given pair (B1,S1) is not an equilibrium. Because the set we identify is no larger than the
set of equilibria, the density of the set of all equilibria, including equilibria with ratios outside Γ, will be
at least as great as indicated in Theorem 2.
15Theorem 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds, Sn → ∞, Bn → ∞, and Sn
Bn → γ ∈ (γ, ¯ γ) \ Q.
If εn → 0, and εnBn → +∞, then
|{Bn1 ∈ N ∩ [Bn(α − εn,α + εn)] : Bn1 ∈ N(Bn,Sn)}|
2εnBn
→ H(α,γ)



































Figure 2: The density-of-equilibria function H(α,γ).
Figure 2 contains a graph of the function H(α,γ) for the application considered in Figure
1: the EFM competing auction model with S/B = 1
2. In this case, we ﬁnd α∗(γ) = 1/8,
α∗∗(γ) = 3/8, and Min(1,γ) = 1/2. Hence, when the number of buyers and sellers is
large the equilibrium set includes splits with B1/B ranging from about 1/8 to 7/8. The
equilibrium set reaches a maximum density of 1/2 for values of α between 3/8 and 5/8.
This means that there are true equilibria for about half of the B1 in this range. There are
only half as many sellers as buyers, so this means that there is an equilibrium for almost
all S1 between 3
8S and 5
8S.
Before proving the theorem we ﬁrst need some notation and three lemmas. We will
suppose throughout that B1,B2,S1,S2 ∈ N, B1 + B2 = B, S1 + S2 = S.




B2, γ = S
B, and α1 =
B1
B . Then,
γ2 − γ1 =
γ − γ1
1 − α1

















Proof of Lemma 3



























This implies B1γ1 + B2γ2 = Bγ = B1γ + B2γ, which gives B1(γ1 − γ) = −B2(γ2 − γ), and




The second identity follows from












































17At this point in the proof, we begin to use nonstandard analysisis. Let *N be the set of
nonstandard integers, so that every n ∈ *N\N is an inﬁnite nonstandard natural number.
Given any ﬁnite nonstandard number α, let ◦α denote the standard part of α, the unique
standard real number inﬁnitely close to α.






there is no equilibrium with B1 buyers and S1 sellers in market 1.
Proof of Lemma 4
We may assume without loss of generality that γ1 > γ2. Consider a seller contemplating







































provided ◦γ1 ∈ (γ, ¯ γ) and ◦γ2 ∈ (γ, ¯ γ),which shows there is no equilibrium with B1 buyers
and S1 sellers in market 1.
The previous lemma formalizes the observation that the “diamond” of quasi-equilibria
becomes ﬂatter as the economy grows. The next step is to characterize which splits of
agents between the two markets are compatible with the incentive constraints. EF gave a
suﬃcient condition for incentive compatibility that assumed γ1 = γ2 = γ. The next lemma
improves that condition by considering all γ0s that are consistent with the previous lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose S,B ∈ *N \ N, ◦γ ∈ (γ, ¯ γ), and ◦α1 ∈ (0,1), Then




































∈ (γ, ¯ γ)
If

















then there is no equilibrium with B1 buyers and S1 sellers in market 1.
Proof of Lemma 5
We need to consider the four incentive compatibility constraints corresponding to the
curves S1, S2, B1, and B2. First, consider a seller contemplating switching from market 1














































































































































































19Now, consider a seller contemplating switching from market 2 to market 1. By symme-
try, the incentive compatibility constraint is














(γ − γ1) < α1
Gs(γ)(2α1 − 1)


































Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint for sellers is

















































∈ (α1 − 1 + o(1),α1 + o(1))
This is clearly satisﬁed provided







and clearly not satisﬁed provided







Now, consider a buyer contemplating switching from market 1 to market 2. The change














































































































































































By symmetry, the incentive compatibility constraint for a buyer in market 2 is




































































so the incentive compatibility constraint for buyers is






















21As in the case of sellers, this is satisﬁed provided









and not satisﬁed provided









Remark: The previous lemma characterizes the allocations of agents to each market
that are consistent with the incentive constraints. Since the result uses the approximation
of the utility functions provided by Assumption 1, it is interesting to note that it gives
exactly the range of solutions that EFM obtained for the exact utility functions that arise
with uniformly distributed buyer values in their auction model.
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose γ ∈ (γ, ¯ γ)\Q. Consider three sequences Sn, Bn and εn satisfying the hypotheses
of the theorem. Fix any n ∈ *N \ N. Let S = Sn, B = Bn, ˆ γ = Sn
Bn, K = bεnBnc and
K = {−K,−K + 1,...,−1,0,1...,K − 1,K}. Notice that ◦ˆ γ = γ and N ∈ *N \ N.
For α ∈ *[0,1], let L(α) denote the Lebesgue measure of the intersection
[(α − 1,α) + T(ˆ γ)(1 − 2α)] ∩ (−αˆ γ,(1 − α)ˆ γ)





= min{1, ˆ γ}. The two intervals
(α − 1,α) + T(ˆ γ)(1 − 2α) and (−αˆ γ,(1 − α)ˆ γ) are of length 1 and ˆ γ, and they are both
centered at 0 when α1 = 1
2. The ﬁrst interval moves linearly with slope 1 − 2T(ˆ γ) in
response to changes in α, while the second interval moves linearly with slope −ˆ γ, so the
movement of the ﬁrst interval, relative to the second, is linear with slope 1 + ˆ γ − 2T(ˆ γ) in
response to changes in α. The two intervals cease to be nested when the magnitude of the
relative movement equals
|1−ˆ γ|





|1 − ˆ γ|
2|1 + ˆ γ − 2T(ˆ γ)|
The two intervals cease to intersect when the magnitude of the relative movement equals
1+ˆ γ





1 + ˆ γ
2|1 + ˆ γ − 2T(ˆ γ)|
22Therefore,
L(α) = *H(α, ˆ γ)
for all α ∈ *[0,1].
Given k ∈ K, let
Bk = bαBc + k and αk =
Bk
B
Since the interval [αk − 1,αk) has length 1, there is exactly one Sk such that
Sk − ˆ γBk −
Gs(ˆ γ)(1 − 2αk)
F 0
s(ˆ γ)
∈ [αk − 1,αk)
and for this Sk, we have
Sk − ˆ γBk −
Gs(ˆ γ)(1 − 2αk)
F 0
s(ˆ γ)




Gs(ˆ γ)(1 − 2αk)
F 0
s(ˆ γ)








− α + 1

Sk − ˆ γBk −




= Sk − ˆ γBk −
Gs(ˆ γ)(1 − 2αk)
F 0
s(ˆ γ)




Gs(ˆ γ)(1 − 2αk)
F 0
s(ˆ γ)
− αk + 1








− α + 1

+ T(γ)(1 − 2α) + α(1 + γ) − 1
For k0 ∈ K and k ∈ N,
ˆ γBk0+k = ˆ γB + ˆ γ(k0 + k) = ˆ γBk0 + ˆ γk ' ˆ γBk0 + γk
so by the Spillover Principle, we may pick K1 ∈ *N \ N,
K1
K ' 0, such that
ˆ γBk0+k1 ' ˆ γBk0 + γk1
for k ∈ K1 = {−K1,−K1 + 1,...,−1,0,1,...,K1 − 1,K1} and k0 ∈ K.
23Since γ is irrational, translation (modulo one) by γ is an ergodic transformation of [0,1],
so for any interval (a,b) ⊂ [0,1) and any k0 ∈ K,
|{k ∈ K1 : ◦*r(ˆ γBk0+k)) ∈ (a,b)}|
2K1 + 1
' b − a
hence





k ∈ k0 + K1 : ◦









' L(α) = *H(α, ˆ γ) ' H(α,γ)
We may write K as a union of sets of the form k0 + K1, so
|{k ∈ K : Bk ∈ N(B,S)}|
2K1 + 1
' H(α,γ)
The result follows immediately.
6 Conclusion
In much of the economics literature it is customary to model a large population using
a continuum of agents. Ellison and Fudenberg [3] argued that this is not appropriate
in a class of models of two-sided location choice. They noted that a broad range of
outcomes can be consistent with the no-deviation constraints in some situations that might
be regarded as having only “fully tipped” outcomes when analyzed with a continuum-of-
agents approximation. [3] studied only the incentive constraints, and ignored the constraint
that the number of agents of each type in each market must be an integer. In this
paper, we have extended their analysis to fully take discreteness into account. We ﬁnd
that in the generic case the equilibrium set ﬁlls out an interval strictly containing the
“quasi-equilibrium” set described in EF, but that there are non-generic cases where the
equilibrium set is much smaller. In addition to extending the earlier result, this paper
bolsters the message that taking discreteness into account can be important even in very
large economies. One suggestion for future research would be to examine the implications
of the discreteness of agents in other classes of models. Another would be to examine
24equilibrium selection in models of the type discussed here. We know that these models
have a dense plateau of equilibria. It would be interesting to know more about whether
good evolutionary arguments can be made to regard some of the equilibria as more likely
than others.
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